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“Place and Process: The Environment and Urban Expansion in Early Indianapolis” 
In 1820, the state legislature of Indiana, operating from the Ohio River city of Corydon, 
voted to move the capital of the four years young political entity to Indianapolis.  While the vast 
majority of the state’s 150,000 residents lived in the southern portion of the state, the population 
of the “disjointed mechanism” that was Indiana were loath to work together.  Since the earliest 
settlements, Hoosiers in the eastern Whitewater and western Wabash River Valleys needled each 
other over the rights to internal improvement funds from the state and insisted that one was 
trying to strangle the others’ opportunity.  In order to assuage cries of favoritism, the authorities 
sent surveyors to look for a location that would treat all aspects of the state equally and provide 
“the advantages of a navigable stream and fertility of soil” to all residents. 1   
The quest for centrality, transportation and fertile soil forced to the commissioners to 
choose a site in the central, as yet unsettled, portion of Indiana.  Hoosier leaders hoped to provide 
governmental support to all sections of the state and avoid politically paralyzing regional 
conflicts.  Yet, the search for navigable streams and fertile soils indicate other motivations for 
choosing Indianapolis as the new capital.  Hoosiers were convinced that their state was on the 
path toward agricultural dominance of the West and boosters of cities around the state boasted of 
their fertile soils and outstanding future prospects.  In Marion County—home to Indianapolis—
this trend is most easily seen by examining newspaper articles that promoted the natural 
advantages of the region.  An 1826 article published in the Indiana State Gazette noted that “The 
1 Jacob Piatt Dunn, Greater Indianapolis: The History, the Industries, the Institutions and the People of a City of 
Homes.  (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1910), p. 7.   
almost unrivalled advantages of [Indianapolis’] position, are beginning to attract that general 
share of attention…possessing the advantage of roads leading in every direction, it is a rallying 
point for travelers and emigrants; which gives a great impulse to its prosperity.”  The article 
continued by noting that “Indianapolis in addition to its being the capital of the State, is in the 
heart of a country well watered and not surpassed in point of fertility of soil by any region in 
North America, and capable of sustaining an agricultural and manufacturing population as dense 
as that of France or Germany.  The country has been settled by a class of farmers, remarkable for 
their industry, agricultural knowledge and enterprise; and as enlightened, liberal and moral as 
those of any other section of the Union.”2   
Clearly, newspaper editors were promoting their city because it would draw new 
residents to the area—and presumably more subscriptions—but, newspaper editorials 
represented the desires of local publishers and leaders.  The mindset of the “voiceless” residents 
of Marion County can best be seen by examining the records of the Marion County 
Commissioners office which provide a relatively detailed look at the work done by individuals at 
the local level to harness the economic power of their agriculture.  The record shows an 
immediate and sustained push to build roads and establish local transportation networks that 
mirrored the enthusiasm shown by newspapers.  Unfortunately and unsurprisingly, the language 
of these petitions is exceedingly dry.  For example, at the May 13, 1822 meeting, the 
commissioners heard a petition from local farmer William Townsend, “signed by a number of 
resident citizens and free holders of this County, praying for a new road to be viewed ‘Beginning 
at the north end of Pennsylvania Street in the Town of Indianapolis, thence the nearest and best 
                                                            
2 “Indianapolis,” Indiana State Gazette, October 22, 1829.   
way to the Mills at the Falls of Fall Creek.’” 3  However, while dull, the simple government 
business of building roads was a major aspect of development in Marion County—and other 
rural areas throughout the United States—during the early years of settlement.  Establishing a 
basic road system allowed Hoosiers easier access to various local necessities including mills, 
brickyards and tanneries as well as different local settlements.  The striking thing about these 
petitions is not the language, but the frequency in which they occur.  The first ten years of the 
record are riddled with requests for roads while remonstrances against proposed pathways are 
virtually nonexistent.  Local residents of Marion County were more than happy to invest in roads 
because they recognized the usefulness in increasing the efficiency of their operations and the 
resulting security for their families.  Looking at the record from this perspective shows us why 
the viewers of roads like Isaac Pugh, James Miller and Martin Martindale were focused on 
surveying roads on “as high and good ground” as possible.4  They were constructing strong 
infrastructure for an economic network that allowed the community access to the necessary 
commercial structures and would permit them to increase their profitability when shipping their 
goods to mills or downriver.   
However, environmental realities prevented Hoosiers from realizing their dreams.  
Droughts, muskrats and occasional malaria outbreaks all conspired to prevent Euro-Americans 
from mastering the trans-Appalachian north.  But the most significant barrier to early 
development in Marion County was the shallowness of the White River.  While boosters 
defended the state’s assertion that the White River was “navigable by law,” the environment had 
the final say in matters of navigation.  Frequent complaints noted that the riverbed was so 
                                                            
3 May 13, 1822, Commissioners’ Record, Vol. 1, 1822‐1827, Marion County, IN.  Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Records Survey, 1941.   
4 February 9, 1824, Commissioners’ Record, Vol. 1, 1822‐1827, Marion County, IN.  Indianapolis: The Indiana 
Historical Records Survey, 1941.   
shallow that riverboats ran aground “two or three times per mile.”5  The only boats that could 
make the trip to the Ohio were flat- or keel-boats that rode spring rushes downstream.  Farmers 
and merchants were forced to pull any shipments back north on expensive wagons thereby 
limiting any profits. 
Moreover, Marion County suffered from watershed problems in the North.  During the 
1830s, the Mammoth Internal Improvement Act pushed to improve the Wabash River and 
connect it with Lake Erie, hoping to use the recently completed Erie Canal and shorten the route 
from East to West.  Unfortunately for Hoosiers, the Maumee River—which flowed from 
Northern Indiana into Lake Erie—also flowed through Ohio.  Ohioans had reservations about 
allowing a direct western competitor access to Lake Erie and were accused of dragging their feet 
on purpose in order to arrest the growth of their western neighbor.  For Hoosiers, holding ideal 
agricultural land was of little use if they could not export their products due to political and 
environmental limitations. 
Not until the railroad connected Indianapolis with the Ohio River did Hoosiers in central 
Indiana have any real economic success.  The Panic of 1837 had crippled the state financially 
and forced residents to abandon any hopes of completing internal improvement projects.  The 
canals were never finished and railroads faltered before they could even start.  Only resumed 
national economic activity in the early 1840s allowed for railroad construction in central Indiana 
that would eventually propel the area to economic success by the end of the century.  Hoosiers 
could not realize their visions of economic success until they divorced themselves from the 
transportation barriers posed by the environment.   
                                                            
5 Paul Fatout, Indiana Canals, (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1976), 30.   
 Ultimately, the story of an urban area bending to the will of the natural world is far from 
special.  The important point to collect from this presentation is that Indianapolis is an ideal 
setting for historians to begin reexamining the methodologies used to understand the 
development of the American West.  This paper argues that historians will benefit from 
combining two of the main methods used by Western historians to understand American 
development.  By combining Frederick Jackson Turner’s assertion that American development 
was a process that repeated itself as settlers moved across the continent with Walter Prescott 
Webb’s concept that place is the defining factor in national growth, historians will be able to 
recalibrate the study of national development to comprehensively examine how the process and 
place interact with each other.   
For decades, these two methods were considered at loggerheads to each other.   The 
disciples of Turner and Webb fought vigorously against one another in academic journals to 
promote one approach or the other.  Only recently, have historians began to understand the 
combination of both process and place when examining American development.  Most famously, 
Patricia Nelson Limerick’s Legacy of Conquest challenged the uni-methodological approach 
toward understanding American development by insisting “the history of the West is a study of a 
place undergoing conquest and never fully escaping its consequences.”6  She argues that 
historians must examine the processes of change in the West in order to understand how the 
region has remained a conquered portion of the American nation.  Significantly, she suggests that 
historians should examine the processes that occur in specific places—especially how cultural 
myths grow and mutate—to understand how the West explains American development.   
                                                            
6 Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West.  (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1987), p. 26.   
Limerick’s argument from 1989 has made significant historiographical waves.  The “New 
Western History”—rightly—dominates the field of western studies because of its multi-
discplinarianism and intellectual flexibility.  However, the limits of this method are geographical 
and chronological.  The modern historiography of the American West has limited its 
geographical scope to lands west of the Mississippi River—mostly focusing on the Plains, 
Mountain West and Pacific Slope.   Few major works discuss Minnesota, Iowa or Louisiana, and 
even fewer discuss the western characteristics of states east of the Mississippi River.  Stephen 
Aron’s How the West was Lost is the best recent book to examine the processes of change in the 
trans-Appalachian frontier.  But his focus is on what did not happen.  For Aron, equal land 
distribution, continuing common rights and pioneering homesteading privileges were the lost 
opportunities of the West.7 
My dissertation on the integration of Indianapolis into the national economy seeks to 
bring the historiographical approaches of the New Western History to the Old Northwest.  In 
1816, Indiana was on the western periphery of American statehood and was attempting to 
develop its natural resources like any other state in the Union.  By examining the ways in which 
the geographical “place” affected the chronological “process” of development—in the case of 
Marion County, the failure of the White River as a navigable stream and its effect on the local 
economy—I hope to bring the New Western History east of the Mississippi River and recalibrate 
the history of western studies to account for temporality.  Throughout American history, 
westerners have felt that they were being unfairly treated by eastern power brokers and 
politicians.  Nathaniel Bacon and Daniel Shays led violent rebellions aimed at creating a more 
equitable society for those on the outskirts and Jacksonian claims against eastern, aristocratic 
                                                            
7 Stephen Aron, How the West was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky From Daniel Boone to Henry Clay.  / 
privilege—and his subsequent landslide victory in 1828—show that Americans in the Old 
Northwest felt as “conquered” by the East Coast in the antebellum era as citizens from Colorado, 
Arizona or Utah during the late nineteenth century.  By understanding the shared experiences of 
westerners across time and space, historians will be able to enrich our understanding of the 
American experience and provide continuity with the past.   
For instance, if we look at land values in other nineteenth century urban centers, we see 
that Marion County clearly lags.  In 1850, Marion County soil was worth $18/acre while 
Jefferson County, KY was worth $34/acre and Hamilton County, OH was worth $83/acre.  The 
average farm value in Marion County was a slight $2,189 while Cincinnati average farm values 
were three times as much at $6,706 and Louisville average farm value was $6,150.  Meanwhile, 
Franklin County, OH land was worth $24 and the average farm value was $2,367.  It was not 
until 1870 that Indianapolis caught up to Louisville in terms of land value at $85 and$84/acre 
respectively.  But Marion County, remained far short of Cincinnati or Pittsburgh, which had land 
prices at $138 and $145/acre.   
What these numbers show is that—unsurprisingly—landlocked cities dawdled behind 
their riverbed brethren into the second half of the nineteenth century.  Instead of being a panacea 
that immediately brought a rail city into the national market, urban centers in the Old Northwest 
experienced a significant lag time when integrating into national markets in much the same 
fashion that Des Moines, Wichita or Lincoln experienced.  These are not the only numbers that 
show how the decision to place Indianapolis on the White River hurt the city.  But they are 
effective reminders of the way that Turner’s “process,” however faulty, can still provide a useful 
interpretive model if we begin to construct our analyses in more creative ways.  I hope to bring 
the “process” and the “place” together in a new analytical push in order to get the East 
reacquainted with the West in the Middle Ground of the Midwest and refocus attention on the 
region that continues to be “America’s Heartland.” 
